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[스크랩] 베르그송 (프랑스 철학자) [Bergson, Henri-Louis]

by 마리산인1324 2010. 10. 5.
 
 

Henri Bergson

 

Western Philosophy
19th century philosophy
Portrait of Henri Bergson by J.E. Blanche 1891
Name
Henri-Louis Bergson
Birth October 18, 1859(1859-10-18)
Paris, France
Death January 4, 1941 (aged 81)
Paris, France
School/tradition Continental philosophy
Nobel Prize in Literature
1927
Main interests Metaphysics, Epistemology, philosophy of language,
philosophy of mathematics
Notable ideas Duration, Intuition,
Élan Vital,
Open Society
Influenced by Ravaisson, Spencer
Influenced Deleuze, Kazantzakis, Kuki, Merleau-Ponty, Proust, Whitehead

Henri-Louis Bergson (IPA: [bɛʁkˈsɔn]; October 18, 1859January 4, 1941) was a French philosopher, influential in the first half of the 20th century.

 Biography

[edit] Overview

Bergson was born in the Rue Lamartine in Paris, not far from the Palais Garnier (the old Paris opera house) in 1859, the year of the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species. He was descended from a Polish Jewish family (originally Berekson) on his father's side, while his mother was from an English and Irish Jewish background. His family lived in London for a few years after his birth, and he obtained an early familiarity with the English language from his mother. Before he was nine, his parents crossed the English Channel and settled in France, Henri becoming a naturalized citizen of the Republic. His sister, Mina Bergson (also known as Moina Mathers), married the English occult author Samuel Liddell MacGregor Mathers, a leader of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, and the couple later relocated to Paris as well.

Bergson lived the quiet life of a French professor. Its chief landmarks were the publication of his four principal works: in 1889, Time and Free Will (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience); in 1896, Matter and Memory (Matière et mémoire); in 1907, Creative Evolution (L'Evolution créatrice); and in 1932, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion).

He was named in 1900 as professor in the College of France, holding the Chair of Greek and Latin Philosophy, which he held until 1904. He then replaced Gabriel Tarde in the Chair of Modern Philosophy, which he held until 1920. His courses were attended by a large public.

Education and career

Bergson attended the Lycée Fontaine (now known as the Lycée Condorcet) in Paris from 1868 to 1878, and also received a Jewish religious education. Between 14 and 16, he lost his religious faith. According to Hude (1990), this moral crisis was tied to his discovery of the theory of evolution [1].

While there he won a prize for his scientific work and another, in 1877 when he was eighteen, for the solution of a mathematical problem. His solution was published the following year in Annales de Mathématiques. It was his first published work. After some hesitation as to whether his career should lie in the sphere of the sciences or that of the humanities, he decided in favour of the latter, to the dismay of his teachers [2]. When he was nineteen, he entered the famous École Normale Supérieure. During this period, he read Herbert Spencer [2]. He obtained there the degree of Licence-ès-Lettres, and this was followed by that of Agrégation de philosophie in 1881 .

The same year he received a teaching appointment at the Lycée in Angers, the ancient capital of Anjou. Two years later he settled at the Lycée Blaise-Pascal in Clermont-Ferrand, capital of the Puy-de-Dôme département.

The year after his arrival at Clermont-Ferrand Bergson displayed his ability in the humanities by the publication of an excellent edition of extracts from Lucretius, with a critical study of the text and the materialist cosmology of the poet (1884), a work whose repeated editions are sufficient evidence of its useful place in the promotion of classical study among the youth of France. While teaching and lecturing in this part of his country (the Auvergne region), Bergson found time for private study and original work. He crafted his dissertation Time and Free Will, which was submitted, along with a short Latin thesis on Aristotle (L'idée de lieu chez Aristote), for his doctoral degree which was awarded by the University of Paris in 1889. The work was published in the same year by Félix Alcan. He also gave courses in Clermont-Ferrand on the Pre-Socratics, in particular on Heraclitus [2].

Bergson dedicated Time and Free Will to Jules Lachelier, then public education minister, who was a disciple of Félix Ravaisson and the author of a rather important philosophical work On the Founding of Induction (Du fondement de l'induction, 1871). Lachelier endeavoured "to substitute everywhere force for inertia, life for death, and liberty for fatalism." (Lachelier was born in 1832, Ravaisson in 1813 . Bergson owed much to both of these teachers of the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Cf. his memorial address on Ravaisson, who died in 1900 .)

Bergson settled again in Paris, and after teaching for some months at the Municipal College, known as the College Rollin, he received an appointment at the Lycée Henri-Quatre, where he remained for eight years. There, he read Charles Darwin and gave a course on him [2]. Although he previously endorsed Lamarckism and its theory of the heritability of acquired characteristics, he then preferred Darwin's hypothesis of gradual variations, which were more compatible with his continuist vision of life [2].

In 1896 he published his second large work, entitled Matter and Memory. This rather difficult, but brilliant, work investigates the function of the brain, undertakes an analysis of perception and memory, leading up to a careful consideration of the problems of the relation of body and mind. Bergson had spent years of research in preparation for each of his three large works. This is especially obvious in Matter and Memory, where he showed a thorough acquaintance with the extensive pathological investigations which had been carried out during the period.

In 1898 Bergson became Maître de conférences at his Alma Mater, L'Ecole Normale Supérieure, and was later promoted to a Professorship. The year 1900 saw him installed as Professor at the Collège de France, where he accepted the Chair of Greek and Latin Philosophy in succession to Charles L'Eveque.

At the First International Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris during the first five days of August, 1900, Bergson read a short, but important, paper, "Psychological Origins of the Belief in the Law of Causality" (Sur les origines psychologiques de notre croyance à la loi de causalité). In 1901 Félix Alcan published a work which had previously appeared in the Revue de Paris, entitled Laughter (Le rire), one of the most important of Bergson's minor productions. This essay on the meaning of comedy was based on a lecture which he had given in his early days in the Auvergne. The study of it is essential to an understanding of Bergson's views of life, and its passages dealing with the place of the artistic in life are valuable. The main thesis of the work is that laughter is a corrective evolved to make social life possible for human beings. We laugh at people who fail to adapt to the demands of society, if it seems their failure is akin to an inflexible mechanism. Comic authors have exploited this human tendency to laugh in various ways, and what is common to them is the idea that the comic consists in there being "something mechanical encrusted on the living".[3][4]

In 1901 Bergson was elected to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, and became a member of the Institute. In 1903 he contributed to the Revue de métaphysique et de morale a very important essay entitled Introduction to Metaphysics (Introduction à la metaphysique), which is useful as a preface to the study of his three large books. He detailed in this essay his philosophical program, realized in the Creative Evolution [2].

On the death of Gabriel Tarde, the eminent sociologist, in 1904, Bergson succeeded him in the Chair of Modern Philosophy. From the 4th to September 8 of that year he was at Geneva attending the Second International Congress of Philosophy, when he lectured on The Mind and Thought: A Philosophical Illusion (Le cerveau et la pensée: une illusion philosophique). An illness prevented his visiting Germany to attend the Third Congress held at Heidelberg.

His third major work, Creative Evolution, appeared in 1907, and is undoubtedly the most widely known and most discussed. It constitutes one of the most profound and original contributions to the philosophical consideration of the theory of evolution. Imbart de la Tour remarked that Creative Evolution was a milestone of new direction in thought. By 1918, Alcan, the publisher, had issued twenty-one editions, making an average of two editions per annum for ten years. Following the appearance of this book, Bergson's popularity increased enormously, not only in academic circles, but among the general reading public.

At that time, Bergson had already studied extensively biology, being aware of the theory of fecundation (as shown by the first chapter of the Creative Evolution), which had only recently emerged, in the 1885s—which was no small feat for a philosopher specialized in history of philosophy, in particular Greek and Latin philosophy [2]. He also most certainly had read, apart of Darwin, Haeckel, from whom he retained his idea of an unity of life and of the ecological solidarity between all living beings [2], as well as Hugo de Vries, whom he quoted his mutation theory of evolution (which he opposed, preferring Darwin's gradualism) [2]. He also quoted Charles-Édouard Brown-Séquard, the successor of Claude Bernard at the Chair of Experimental Medicine in the College of France, etc.

[edit] Relationship with James and Pragmatism

Bergson came to London in 1908 where he met William James, the Harvard philosopher who was Bergson's senior by seventeen years, and who was instrumental in calling the attention of the Anglo-American public to the work of the French professor. The two became great friends. James's impression of Bergson is given in his Letters under date of October 4, 1908:

"So modest and unpretending a man but such a genius intellectually! I have the strongest suspicions that the tendency which he has brought to a focus, will end by prevailing, and that the present epoch will be a sort of turning point in the history of philosophy."

As early as 1880 James had contributed an article in French to the periodical La Critique philosophique, of Renouvier and Pillon, entitled Le Sentiment de l'Effort. Four years later a couple of articles by him appeared in the journal Mind: "What is an Emotion?" and "On some Omissions of Introspective Psychology." Of these articles the first two were quoted by Bergson in his 1889 work, Time and Free Will. In the following years 1890-91 appeared the two volumes of James's monumental work, The Principles of Psychology, in which he refers to a pathological phenomenon observed by Bergson. Some writers, taking merely these dates into consideration and overlooking the fact that James's investigations had been proceeding since 1870 (registered from time to time by various articles which culminated in "The Principles"), have mistakenly dated Bergson's ideas as earlier than James's.

It has been suggested that Bergson owes the root ideas of his first book to the 1884 article by James, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology," which he neither refers to nor quotes. This article deals with the conception of thought as a stream of consciousness, which intellect distorts by framing into concepts. Bergson replied to this insinuation by denying that he had any knowledge of the article by James when he wrote Les données immédiates de la conscience. The two thinkers appear to have developed independently until almost the close of the century. They are further apart in their intellectual position than is frequently supposed. Both have succeeded in appealing to audiences far beyond the purely academic sphere, but only in their mutual rejection of "intellectualism" as final is there real unanimity. Although James was slightly ahead in the development and enunciation of his ideas, he confessed that he was baffled by many of Bergson's notions. James certainly neglected many of the deeper metaphysical aspects of Bergson's thought, which did not harmonize with his own, and are even in direct contradiction. In addition to this, Bergson can hardly be considered a pragmatist. For him, "utility," far from being a test of truth, was in fact the reverse: a synonym for error.

Nevertheless, William James hailed Bergson as an ally. Early in the century (1903) he wrote:

"I have been re-reading Bergson's books, and nothing that I have read since years has so excited and stimulated my thoughts. I am sure that that philosophy has a great future, it breaks through old cadres and brings things into a solution from which new crystals can be got."

The most noteworthy tributes paid by him to Bergson were those made in the Hibbert Lectures (A Pluralistic Universe), which James gave at Manchester College, Oxford, shortly after meeting Bergson in London. He remarks on the encouragement he has received from Bergson's thought, and refers to the confidence he has in being "able to lean on Bergson's authority."

The influence of Bergson had led him "to renounce the intellectualist method and the current notion that logic is an adequate measure of what can or cannot be." It had induced him, he continued, "to give up logic, squarely and irrevocably" as a method, for he found that "reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows, and surrounds it."

These remarks, which appeared in James's book A Pluralistic Universe in 1909, impelled many English and American readers to an investigation of Bergson's philosophy for themselves. A certain handicap existed in that his greatest work had not then been translated into English. James, however, encouraged and assisted Dr. Arthur Mitchell in his preparation of the English translation of Creative Evolution. In August of 1910 James died. It was his intention, had he lived to see the completion of the translation, to introduce it to the English reading public by a prefatory note of appreciation. In the following year the translation was completed and still greater interest in Bergson and his work was the result. By a coincidence, in that same year (1911), Bergson penned a preface of sixteen pages entitled Truth and Reality for the French translation of James's book, "Pragmatism". In it he expressed sympathetic appreciation of James's work, coupled with certain important reservations.

In April (5th to 11th) Bergson attended the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy held at Bologna, in Italy, where he gave an address on "Philosophical Intuition". In response to invitations he visited England in May of that year, and on several subsequent occasions. These visits were well received. His speeches offered new perspectives and elucidated many passages in his three major works: Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, and Creative Evolution. Although necessarily brief statements, they developed and enriched the ideas in his books and clarified for English audiences the fundamental principles of his philosophy.

The lectures on Change, and Bergson's later life

Bergson visited the University of Oxford, where he delivered two lectures entitled The Perception of Change (La perception du changement), which were published in French in the same year by the Clarendon Press. As he had a delightful gift of lucid and brief exposition, when the occasion demands such treatment, these lectures on Change formed a most valuable synopsis or brief survey of the fundamental principles of his thought, and served the student or general reader alike as an excellent introduction to the study of the larger volumes. Oxford honoured its distinguished visitor by conferring upon him the degree of Doctor of Science.

Two days later he delivered the Huxley Lecture at the University of Birmingham, taking for his subject Life and Consciousness. This subsequently appeared in The Hibbert Journal (October, 1911), and since revised, forms the first essay in the collected volume Mind-Energy (L'Energie spirituelle). In October he was again in England, where he had an enthusiastic reception, and delivered at University College London four lectures on La Nature de l'Ame.

In 1913 he visited the United States of America, at the invitation of Columbia University, New York, and lectured in several American cities, where he was welcomed by very large audiences. In February, at Columbia University, he lectured both in French and English, taking as his subjects: Spirituality and Freedom and The Method of Philosophy. Being again in England in May of the same year, he accepted the Presidency of the British Society for Psychical Research, and delivered to the Society an impressive address: Phantoms of Life and Psychic Research (Fantômes des vivants et recherché psychique).

Meanwhile, his popularity increased, and translations of his works began to appear in a number of languages: English, German, Italian, Danish, Swedish, Hungarian, Polish and Russian. In 1914 he was honoured by his fellow-countrymen in being elected as a member of the Académie française. He was also made President of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, and in addition he became Officier de la Légion d'honneur, and Officier de l'Instruction publique.

Bergson found disciples of many varied types, and in France movements such as Neo-Catholicism or Modernism on the one hand and Syndicalism on the other, endeavoured to absorb and to appropriate for their own immediate use and propaganda some of the central ideas of his teaching. That important continental organ of socialist and syndicalist theory, Le Mouvement socialiste, suggested that the realism of Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is hostile to all forms of intellectualism, and that, therefore, supporters of Marxian socialism should welcome a philosophy such as that of Bergson. Other writers, in their eagerness, asserted the collaboration of the Chair of Philosophy at the College de France with the aims of the Confédération Générale du Travail and the Industrial Workers of the World. It was claimed that there is harmony between the flute of personal philosophical meditation and the trumpet of social revolution.

While social revolutionaries were endeavouring to make the most out of Bergson, many leaders of religious thought, particularly the more liberal-minded theologians of all creeds, e.g., the Modernists and Neo-Catholic Party in his own country, showed a keen interest in his writings, and many of them endeavoured to find encouragement and stimulus in his work. The Roman Catholic Church, however, which still believed that finality was reached in philosophy with the work of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and consequently had made that mediaeval! philosophy her official, orthodox, and dogmatic view, took the step of banning Bergson's three books, accused of pantheism (that is, of conceiving of God as immanent to his Creation and of being himself created in the process of the Creation [2]) by placing them upon the Index of prohibited books (Decree of June 1, 1914).

In 1914, the Scottish Universities arranged for Bergson to deliver the famous Gifford Lectures, and one course was planned for the spring and another for the autumn. The first course, consisting of eleven lectures, under the title of The Problem of Personality, was delivered at the University of Edinburgh in the Spring of that year. The course of lectures planned for the autumn months had to be abandoned because of the outbreak of war. Bergson was not, however, silent during the conflict, and he gave some inspiring addresses. As early as November 4, 1914, he wrote an article entitled Wearing and Nonwearing forces (La force qui s'use et celle qui ne s'use pas), which appeared in that unique and interesting periodical of the poilus, Le Bulletin des Armées de la République Française. A presidential address, The Meaning of the War, was delivered in December, 1914, to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques.

Bergson contributed also to the publication arranged by The Daily Telegraph in honour of the King of the Belgians, King Albert's Book (Christmas, 1914). In 1915 he was succeeded in the office of President of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques by Alexandre Ribot, and then delivered a discourse on The Evolution of German Imperialism. Meanwhile he found time to issue at the request of the Minister of Public Instruction a brief summary of French Philosophy. Bergson did a large amount of travelling and lecturing in America during the war. He participated to the negotiations which led to the entry of the United States in the war. He was there when the French Mission under René Viviani paid a visit in April and May 1917, following upon America's entry into the conflict. Viviani's book La Mission française en Amérique (1917), contains a preface by Bergson.

Early in 1918 he was officially received by the Académie française, taking his seat among "The Select Forty" as successor to Emile Ollivier, the author of the large and notable historical work L'Empire libéral. A session was held in January in his honour at which he delivered an address on Ollivier. In the war, Bergson saw the conflict of Mind and Matter, or rather of Life and Mechanism; and thus he shows us the central idea of his own philosophy in action. To no other philosopher has it fallen, during his lifetime, to have his philosophical principles so vividly and so terribly tested.

Bergson in 1927. He was awarded the 1927 Nobel Prize in Literature
Bergson in 1927. He was awarded the 1927 Nobel Prize in Literature

As many of Bergson's contributions to French periodicals were not readily accessible, he agreed to the request of his friends that these should be collected and published in two volumes. The first of these was being planned when war broke out. The conclusion of strife was marked by the appearance of a delayed volume in 1919 . It bears the title Spiritual Energy: Essays and Lectures (L'Energie spirituelle: essais et conférences). The advocate of Bergson's philosophy in England, Dr. Wildon Carr, prepared an English translation under the title Mind-Energy. The volume opens with the Huxley Memorial Lecture of 1911, "Life and Consciousness", in a revised and developed form under the title "Consciousness and Life". Signs of Bergson's growing interest in social ethics and in the idea of a future life of personal survival are manifested. The lecture before the Society for Psychical Research is included, as is also the one given in France, L'Ame et le Corps, which contains the substance of the four London lectures on the Soul. The seventh and last article is a reprint of Bergson's famous lecture to the Congress of Philosophy at Geneva in 1904, The Psycho-Physiolgical Paralogism (Le paralogisme psycho-physiologique), which now appears as Le cerveau et la pensée: une illusion philosophique. Other articles are on the False Recognition, on Dreams, and Intellectual Effort. The volume is a most welcome production and serves to bring together what Bergson wrote on the concept of mental force, and on his view of "tension" and "detension" as applied to the relation of matter and mind.

In June 1920, the University of Cambridge honoured him with the degree of Doctor of Letters. In order that he may be able to devote his full time to the great new work he was preparing on ethics, religion, and sociology, Bergson was relieved of the duties attached to the Chair of Modern Philosophy at the Collège de France. He retained the chair, but no longer delivered lectures, his place being taken by his disciple, the mathematician and philosopher Edouard Le Roy, who supported a conventionalist stance on the foundations of mathematics, which was adopted by Bergson [5]. Le Roy, who also succeeded to Bergson at the Académie française and was a fervent Catholic, extended to revealed truth his conventionalism, leading him to privilege faith, heart and sentiment to dogmas, speculative theology and abstract reasonings. As Bergson, his writings were put to the Index by the Vatican.

Bergson then published Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe (Durée et simultanéité), a book on physics which was followed by a polemical conversation with Albert Einstein at the French Society of Philosophy [2]. The latter book has been often considered as one of his worst, many alleging that his knowledge of physics was very insufficient, and that the book did not follow up contemporary developments on physics [2]. It was not published in the 1951 Edition du Centenaire in French, which contained all of his other works, and was only published later in a work gathering different essays, titled Mélanges. Duration and simultaneity took advantage of Bergson's experience at the League of Nations, where he presided starting in 1920 the International Commission on Intellectual Cooperation (the ancestor of the UNESCO, which included Einstein, Marie Curie, etc.) [2].

Living with his wife and daughter in a modest house in a quiet street near the Porte d'Auteuil in Paris, Bergson won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927 for having written The Creative Evolution. Because of serious rheumatics ailments, he could not travel to Stockholm, and send instead a text which has been published in La Pensée et le mouvant [2].

After his retirement from the Collège, Bergson faded into obscurity, because he was suffering from a degenerative illness (rheumatics, which left him half paralyzed [2]). He completed his new work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, which extended his philosophical theories to the realms of morality, religion and art, in 1935 . It was respectfully received by the public and the philosophical community, but all by that time realized that Bergson's days as a philosophical luminary were past. He was, however, able to reiterate his core beliefs near the end of his life, by renouncing all of the posts and honours previously awarded him, rather than accept exemption from the antisemitic laws imposed by the Vichy government. Though wanting to convert to Catholicism and having personally become a Christian in 1921 [1], he held off instead and showed solidarity with his fellow Jews by signing the registry books.

A Roman Catholic priest said prayers at his funeral per his request. Henri Bergson is buried in the Cimetière de Garches, Hauts-de-Seine.

 Philosophy

One of Bergson's main problems is to think novelty as pure creation, instead of as the unraveling of a predetermined program. His is a philosophy of pure mobility, unforeseeable novelty, creativity and freedom, which can thus be characterized as a process philosophy. It touches upon such topics as time and identity, free will, perception, change, memory, consciousness, language, the foundation of mathematics and the limits of reason.[6]

Criticizing Kant's theory of knowledge exposed in the Critique of Pure Reason and his conception of truth—which he compares to Plato's conception of truth as its symmetrical inversion (order of nature/order of thought)—he attempted to redefine the relations between science and metaphysics, intelligence and intuition, and insisted on the necessity of increasing thought's possibility through the use of intuition, which would be, according to him, the only way of approaching a knowledge of the absolute and of real life, understood as pure duration. Because of his (relative) criticism of intelligence, he makes a frequent uses of images and metaphors in his writings in order to avoid the use of concepts, which he considers fail to touch the whole of reality, being only a sort of abstract net thrown on things. For instance, he says in The Creative Evolution (chap.III) that thought in itself would never have thought it possible for the human being to swim, as it cannot deduce swimming from walking. For swimming to be possible, man must throw itself in water, and only then can thought consider swimming as possible. Intelligence, for Bergson, is a practical faculty rather than a pure speculative faculty, a product of evolution used by man to survive. If metaphysics is to avoid "false problems", it should not extend to pure speculation the abstract concepts of intelligence, but rather use intuition [7].

The Creative Evolution was in particular an attempt to think the continuous creation of life, which explicitly pitted itself against Herbert Spencer's evolutionary philosophy—Spencer had attempted to transpose Darwin's theory of evolution in philosophy and to construct a cosmology based on this theory; he was also the inventor of the expression! "survival of the fittest." Although Spencer is considered as an important influence of Bergson, some have downplayed it, as it seems that Bergson would have very early criticized him [2]. Henri Bergson’s Lebensphilosophie (Philosophy of Life) can be seen as a response to the mechanistic philosophies of his time [8], but also to the failure of Finalism.[2] Indeed, he considers that finalism is unable to explain "duration" and the "continuous creation of life", as it only explains life as the progressive development of an initially determined program—a notion which remains, for example, in the expression! of a "genetic program" [2]; such a description of finalism was adopted, for instance, by Leibniz [2]. Bergson thought that it was impossible to plan beforehand the future, as time itself unraveled unforeseen possibilities. Indeed, a historical event could always be explained retrospectively by its conditions of possibility. But, in the introduction to the Pensée et le mouvant, he explains that such an event created retrospectively its causes, taking the example of the creation of a work of art, for example a symphony: it was impossible to predict what would be the symphony of the future, as if the musician knew what symphony would be the best for his time, he would realize it. In his words, the effect created its cause. Henceforth, he attempted to find a third way between mechanism and finalism, through the notion of an original impulse, the élan vital, in life, which dispersed itself through evolution into contradictory tendencies (he substituted to the finalist notion of a teleological aim a notion of an original impulse).

 Duration

See also: Duration (Bergson)

The foundation of Henri Bergson’s philosophy is his theory of Duration, which he discovered when trying to improve the inadequacies of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy.[8] A theory of time and consciousness, the Duration is introduced in his doctoral theses Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness as a response to another of his influences: Immanuel Kant.[9]

Kant believed freewill could only exist outside of time and space, that we could therefore not know whether or not it exists, and that it is nothing but a pragmatic faith.[9] Bergson’s response was to show that Kant, along with many other philosophers, had confused time with its spatial representation.[10] In reality, the Duration is unextended yet heterogeneous, and so its parts cannot be juxtaposed as a succession of distinct parts, with one causing the other. This made determinism an impossibility and freewill pure mobility, which is what Bergson identified as being the Duration.[11]

 Intuition

See also: Intuition (Bergson)

The Duration then is a unity and a multiplicity, but, being mobile, it cannot be grasped through immobile concepts. Hence the only way to grasp it is through Bergson’s method of intuition. Two images from Henri Bergson’s An Introduction to Metaphysics may help us grasp intuition, the limits of concepts, and the ability of intuition to grasp the absolute. The first is that of a city. Analysis, or the creation of concepts through the divisions of points of view, can only ever give us a model of the city through a construction of photographs taken from every possible point of view, yet it can never give us the dimensional value of walking in the city itself. This can only be grasped through intuition, as can the experience of reading a line of Homer. One may translate the line and pile commentary upon commentary, but this commentary too shall never grasp the simple dimensional value of experiencing the poem in its originality itself. The method of intuition, then, is that of getting back to the things themselves.[12]

 Élan Vital

See also: Élan Vital

The third essential concept of Bergson’s, after Duration and intuition, is the Élan Vital. An idea with the goal of explaining evolution, the Élan Vital first appeared in 1907’s Creative Evolution. Élan Vital is a kind of vital impetus which explains evolution in a less mechanical and more lively manner, as well as the creative impulse of mankind. This concept led Bergson to be characterized by several authors as a supporter of vitalism—although he criticized it explicitly in The Creative Evolution, as he thought, against Driesch and Johannes Reinke (whom he cited) that there is neither "purely internal finality nor clearly cut individuality in nature" [13]:

Hereby lies the stumbling block of vitalist theories (...) It is thus in vain that one pretends to reduce finality to the individuality of the living being. If there is finality in the world of life, it encompasses the whole of life in one indivisible embrace. [14]

Laughter

In the idiosyncratic Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, Bergson develops a theory not of laughter, but of how laughter can be provoked (see his objection to Delage, published on the 23rd edition of the essay [2]). He describes the process of laughter (refusing to give a conceptual definition which would not approach its reality [2]), used in particular by comics and clowns, as the caricature of the mechanism nature of humans (habits, automatic acts, etc.), one of the two tendencies of life (degradation towards inert matter and mechanism, and continual creation of new forms) [2]. However, Bergson warns us that laughter’s criteria of what should be laughed at is not a moral criteria and that it can in fact cause serious damage to a person’s self-esteem. [15] This essay made his opposition to the Cartesian theory of the animal-machine obvious [2].

 Criticisms and reception

From his first publications, Bergson's philosophy attracted strong criticism from different angles, although he was also very popular and durably influenced French philosophy—the epistemologist Gaston Bachelard, for example, explicitly alluded to him in the last pages of his 1938 book (The Formation of the Scientific Mind). The mathematician Edouard Le Roy was Bergson's main disciple. Others influenced include Vladimir Jankélévitch, who wrote a book on him (Henri Bergson) in 1931, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Gilles Deleuze who wrote Le bergsonisme in 1966 (transl. 1988). Bergson is also often classified as an influence upon the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, as well as the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Lévinas.[16] The Greek author Nikos Kazantzakis studied under Bergson in Paris and his writing and philosophy were profoundly influenced as a result.[17]

Many writers of the early 20th century criticized his intuitionism, indeterminism, psychologism and unique interpretation of the scientific impulse. Among those who explicitly criticized Bergson (either in published articles or letters) were Bertrand Russell (see his short book on the subject), George Santayana (see his study on the author in "Winds of Doctrine"), G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Julien Benda (see his book on the subject), T. S. Eliot, Paul Valéry (despite some recent claims otherwise), Andre Gide (see below), Marxists philosophers such as Theodor W. Adorno (see "Against Epistemology"), Lucio Colletti (see "Hegel and Marxism"), Jean-Paul Sartre (see his early book Imagination—although Sartre also appropriated himself Bergsonian thesis on novelty as pure creation - see Situations I, Gallimard 1947, p.314) and Georges Politzer (see the latter's two books on the subject: Le Bergsonisme, une Mystification Philosophique and La fin d'une parade philosophique: le Bergsonisme both of which had a tremendous effect on French existential phenomenology), as well as (the non-Marxist) Maurice Blanchot (see Bergson and Symbolism), American philosophers such as Irving Babbitt, Arthur Lovejoy, Josiah Royce, The New Realists (Ralph B. Perry, E. B. Holt, and William P. Montague), The Critical Realists (Durant Drake, Roy W. Sellars, C. A. Strong, and A. K. Rogers), Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, Roger Fry (see his letters), Julian Huxley (in Evolution: The Modern Synthesis) and Virginia Woolf (for the latter, see Ann Banfield, The Phantom Table).

Bergson was accused by the Vatican of being pantheistic, while free-thinkers, who formed a large part of the teachers and professors of the French Third Republic, accused him of spiritualism. Still others have characterized his philosophy as a materialist emergentismSamuel Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan explicitly claimed Bergson as their forebearer [2]. According to Henri Hude (1990, II, p.142), who supports himself on the whole of Bergson's works as well as his now published courses, accusing him of pantheism is a "counter-sense". Hude alleges that a mystical experience, roughly outlined at the end of Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion, is the inner principle of his whole philosophy, although this has been contested by other commentators.

C. S. Peirce took strong exception to being aligned with Bergson. In response to a letter comparing his work with that of Bergson he wrote, “a man who seeks to further science can hardly commit a greater sin than to use the terms of his science without anxious care to use them with strict accuracy; it is not very gratifying to my feelings to be classed along with a Bergson who seems to be doing his prettiest to muddle all distinctions.” William James’s students resisted the assimilation of his work to that of Bergson’s. See, for example, Horace Kallen’s book on the subject James and Bergson. As Jean Wahl described the “ultimate disagreement” between James and Bergson in his System of Metaphysics:

“for James, the consideration of action is necessary for the definition of truth, according to Bergson, action...must be kept from our mind if we want to see the truth.” Gide even went so far as to say that future historians will over-estimate Bergson’s influence on art and philosophy just because he was the self-appointed spokesman for “the spirit of the age.”

As early as the 1890s, Santayana attacked certain key concepts in Bergson’s philosophy, above all his view of the New and the indeterminate:

“the possibility of a new and unaccountable fact appearing at any time,” he writes in his book on Lotze, “does not practically affect the method of investigation;...the only thing given up is the hope that these hypotheses may ever be adequate to the reality and cover the process of nature without leaving a remainder. This is no great renunciation; for that consummation of science...is by no one really expected.”

According to Santayana and Russell, Bergson projected false claims onto the aspirations of scientific method, which Bergson needed to make in order to justify his prior moral commitment to freedom. Russell takes particular exception to Bergson’s understanding of number in chapter two of Time and Free-will. According to Russell, Bergson uses an outmoded spatial metaphor (“extended images”) to describe the nature of mathematics as well as logic in general. “Bergson only succeeds in making his theory of number possible by confusing a particular collection with the number of its terms, and this again with number in general,” writes Russell (see The Philosophy of Bergson and A History of Western Philosophy).

Further still, the élan vital was seen to be a projection of the inner life, a moral feeling, onto the world at large. The external world, according to certain theories of probability, provides less and less indeterminism with further refinement of scientific method. In brief, the moral, psychological, and aesthethic demand for the new, the underivable and the unexplained should not be confused with our imagination of the universe at large. A difference remains between our inner sense of becoming and the non-human character of the outer world, which, according to the ancient materialist Lucretius should not be characterized as either one of becoming or being, creation or destruction (De Rerum Natura).

 See also

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Henri Hude, Bergson, Paris, Editions universitaires, 1990, 2 volumes, quoted by Anne Fagot-Largeau in the 21 December 2006 course at the College of France
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x Anne Fagot-Largeau, 21 December 2006 course at the College of France (audio file of the course)
  3. ^ p.39
  4. ^ Seth Benedict Graham A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSO-SOVIET ANEKDOT 2003 p.2
  5. ^ See Chapter III of The Creative Evolution
  6. ^ The topics can be found explored in Henri Bergson's Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution, and The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics.
  7. ^ Elie Duhring, « Fantômes de problèmes », published by the Centre International d'Etudes de la Philosophie Française Contemporaine (short version first published in Le magazine littéraire, n°386, April 2000 (issue dedicated to Bergson)
  8. ^ a b Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 11 to 13.
  9. ^ a b The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Time and Free Will has to be seen as an attack on Kant, for whom freedom belongs to a realm outside of space and time.
  10. ^ Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Author's Preface.
  11. ^ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy For Bergson—and perhaps this is his greatest insight—freedom is mobility.
  12. ^ Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, pages 160 to 161.
  13. ^ L'Evolution créatrice, pp.42-44; pp.226-227
  14. ^ L'Evolution créatrice, pp.42-43
  15. ^ Henri Bergson's theory of laughter. A brief summary.
  16. ^ Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, pages 322 and 393.
  17. ^ Peter Bien, Three Generations of Greek Writers, Published by Efstathiadis Group, Athens, 1983

Bibliography

 External links

 Works online

Wikisource
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Preceded by
Émile Ollivier
Seat 7, Académie française
1914-1941
Succeeded by
Édouard le Roy


Persondata
NAME Bergson, Henri
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Bergson, Henri-Louis
SHORT DESCRIPTION philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH birth = 1859 October 18
PLACE OF BIRTH Paris, France
DATE OF DEATH 1941 January 4
PLACE OF DEATH Paris, France
 
 
베르그송
(프랑스 철학자)  [Bergson, Henri-Louis]

1859. 10. 18 프랑스 파리~1941. 1. 4 파리.
프랑스의 철학자.
개요
베르그송 /베르그송(1928)
과정철학이라 부르는 철학사조를 최초로 정교하게 발전시켰다. 정지보다 운동·변화·진화의 가치를 더 높게 평가했으며 학문적·대중적 호소력을 겸비한 문체의 대가였다(→ 실증주의).
 
초기생애
 
재능있는 음악가였던 아버지로부터 부유한 폴란드계 유대인 집안의 혈통을 이어받았다. 베르그송이란 이름은 베레크의 아들(Berek-son)이란 말에서 나온 것이다. 어머니는 영국계 유대인 집안 출신이었다. 그러나 베르그송의 양육·교육 과정과 관심사는 전형적인 프랑스식이었고, 사실상 전생애를 차지했던 교수생활도 프랑스, 그중에서도 대부분을 파리에서 보냈다.
파리에 있는 리세 콩도르세에서 기초교육을 받았는데 과학과 인문학에 똑같이 뛰어난 재능을 보였다. 1878~81년 대학강사 양성기관인 파리 고등사범학교에서 공부했다. 여기서 받은 일반교양교육 덕택에 그리스어와 라틴어 고전을 어렵지 않게 읽을 수 있었으며, 졸업 후 바로 철학 교사로 출발할 수 있었다. 교육자로서의 그의 경력은 파리 근교의 여러 리세(국립고등학교)에서 시작되었다. 1881~83년 이후 5년간은 클레르몽페랑에 있었다. 클레르몽페랑에서 그는 첫번째 철학 저술에 토대와 영감을 제공한 직관을 얻을 수 있었다. 훗날 그는 저명한 미국의 실용주의 철학자 윌리엄 제임스에게 다음과 같은 편지를 써보냈다.
"나는 그때까지 이전에 허버트 스펜서를 읽고 접한 기계론적 이론에 완전히 빠져 있었습니다. …… 내가 몰두하던 문제는 시간개념을 분석하는 것이었는데, 그것은 시간개념이 역학과 물리학을 가능하게 만드는 핵심개념이었기 때문입니다. 나는 놀랍게도 과학에서 말하는 시간은 '지속하지' 않고 …… 실증과학은 본질적으로 지속을 제거함으로써 성립한다는 사실을 깨달았습니다. 이것을 일련의 사색의 출발점으로 삼아 나는 점차 그때까지 받아들인 거의 모든 것을 거부하고 내 관점을 완전히 바꾸게 되었습니다."
이 변화의 첫 결과물이 박사학위 논문인 〈시간과 자유의지:의식의 직접 자료에 대한 소론 Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience〉(1889)이었다. 이 글에서 그는 지속 또는 실제 시간개념을 확립함으로써 과학이 사용해온 시간개념, 곧 시계로 측정할 수 있는 공간화한 시간개념을 거부하려 했다. 그는 인간이 자신의 내적 자아에 대해 알고 있는 것을 분석하여 심리적 사실은 다른 사실과는 질적으로 다르다는 것을 증명했고, 심리학자들은 특히 심리적 사실을 양화(量化)해서 계산하려고 함으로써 이를 왜곡한다고 비판했다. 특히 자극의 강도와 이에 상응하는 감각의 강도 사이에 계산할 수 있는 관계를 확립했다고 주장하는 페히너의 법칙을 비판했다(→ 베버-페히너의 법칙). 또한 지속과 연장, 연속과 동시, 질과 양 사이의 혼동을 일단 제거하고 나면, 과학적 결정론의 이름을 빌어서 인간이 자유롭다는 사실을 거부한다는 것은 근거없는 것으로 볼 수 있다고 주장했다.
 
철학적 업적
 
〈시간과 자유의지:의식의 직접 자료에 대한 소론〉 발간 이후 베르그송은 파리로 돌아와 앙리 4세 리세에서 가르쳤다. 1891년에는 프랑스 소설가 마르셀 프루스트의 사촌인 루이즈 뇌부르주와 결혼했다. 이동안 그는 심신관계에 대한 연구에 착수했다(→ 심신이원론). 당시 지배적인 견해는 이른바 심리생리적 평행론으로서 모든 심리적 사실에 상응하는 생리적 사실이 있고 생리적 사실이 심리적 사실을 엄격히 결정한다는 주장이었다. 베르그송은 앞서 박사논문에서 결정론의 주장을 논박하긴 했지만 마음과 몸이 어떻게 관계 맺는지는 설명하지 않았다. 이 문제에 관한 탐구결과는 1896년 〈물질과 기억:육체와 정신의 관계에 대한 소론 Matière et mémoire:Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit〉으로 출판되었다.
이 책은 그의 책 중 가장 어렵고 가장 완벽한 것 같다. 이 책의 접근방식은 그의 철학하는 방법을 전형적으로 보여준다. 그는 일반적 사변을 통해 문제에 접근하지 않았고 거대한 사변체계를 구성하는 데는 관심이 없었다. 다른 저술과 마찬가지로 여기에서도 특수한 문제에 관해 알려져 있는 경험적 관찰사실을 먼저 탐구했다. 이때문에 〈물질과 기억:육체와 정신의 관계에 대한 소론〉을 쓰기 위해 기억과 특히 언어사용 능력을 잃어버리는 실어증이라는 심리적 사실에 관한 문헌을 공부하는 데 5년을 보냈다. 심리생리적 평행론에 따르면, 뇌의 손상은 심리적 능력의 토대에도 영향을 미칠 수밖에 없다. 그러나 베르그송의 주장에 의하면 실어증이 생기는 것은 이 주장이 거짓임을 보여준다. 실어증에 걸린 사람은 다른 사람이 말하려 하는 것을 이해하고 자신이 말하고 싶은 것도 알고 있으며 언어기관에 아무런 장애가 없지만 말을 할 수 없다. 그의 주장에 따르면 이 경우 잃어버린 것은 기억이 아니라 그 기억을 표현하는 데 필요한 육체적 기재(mechanism)이다. 이 관찰로부터 베르그송은 기억, 따라서 마음 또는 정신이란 육체와 독립적인 것이며 자신의 목적을 수행하기 위해 육체를 이용한다고 결론지었다. 〈시간과 자유의지:의식의 직접적 자료에 대한 소론〉이 전문잡지에서 여러 번 소개된 반면, 〈물질과 기억:육체와 정신의 관계에 대한 소론〉은 많은 일반 독자의 주의를 끌었다. 이 두 저서는 베르그송이 당대의 가장 대중적이고 영향력있는 강연자 겸 저술가로 발돋움하는 데 발판이 되었다. 1897년에는 19세 때 학생으로 입학했던 고등사범학교의 철학교수가 되었다. 그후 1900년 프랑스 최고의 명문 학교인 콜레주 드 프랑스의 강사가 되어 제1차 세계대전이 일어날 때까지 베르그송주의를 유행시킬 만큼 큰 인기를 누렸다. 열렬한 독자였던 윌리엄 제임스와는 절친한 친구가 되었다. 베르그송 철학에 대한 해설서와 주석서는 전세계 어디에서든 찾아볼 수 있게 되었고, 사람들은 문학·음악·미술·정치·종교 분야를 밝게 비추어 줄 철학의 새 시대가 밝아오기 시작했다고 주장했다.
이 시대의 가장 위대한 저작이며 베르그송의 가장 유명한 책인 〈창조적 진화 L'Évolution créatrice〉(1907)는 생물학이 그의 사상에 끼친 영향을 보여줌과 동시에 과정철학자로서의 면모를 가장 명확하게 보여주었다. 베르그송은 생명개념을 검토하면서 진화를 과학에 의해 확립된 사실로 받아들였다(→ 진화설). 그러나 진화에 대한 이전의 철학적 해석들은 지속개념의 중요성을 보지 못함으로써 생명의 독특성을 무시했다고 비판했다.
그는 진화 과정 전체를 지속적으로 발전하면서 새로운 형태를 발생시키는 '생명의 약동'(élan vital)이 지속되는 것으로 보자고 제안했다. 즉 진화란 기계적이 아니라 창조적이라는 것이다. 이 발전과정에서 베르그송은 2가지 흐름을 추적했다. 하나는 본능을 통해 곤충에 이르는 길이고 다른 하나는 지성의 진화를 통해 인간에 이르는 길이다. 그러나 이 2가지 길은 모두 세계 전체에서 똑같은 생명의 약동이 활동하는 방식이다. '사고에 대한 영화촬영술적 기계론과 기계론의 환상'이라는 제목이 붙은 마지막 장에서 철학적 사유의 역사 전체를 검토하면서, 그동안의 모든 철학이 생성의 본성과 중요성을 올바로 파악하지 못함으로써 정적·불연속적 개념을 끌어들여 실재의 본성을 왜곡했음을 보여주려고 했다.
베르그송의 비교적 짧은 저술로는 〈웃음:희극적인 것의 의미에 관한 소론 Le Rire:Essai sur la significance du comique〉(1900)과 〈형이상학 개론 Introduction à la metaphysique〉(1903)이 있다. 〈형이상학 개론〉은 베르그송 철학에 대한 가장 좋은 소개서로서 그의 방법을 아주 분명하게 설명하고 있다. 그는 앎에는 근본적으로 다른 2가지 방법이 있다고 주장했다(→ 인식론). 하나는 과학에서 가장 널리 발전한 것으로 분석화·공간화·개념화하여 사물을 고정적·불연속적인 것으로 보는 방법이다. 다른 하나는 공감(sympathy)을 통해 사물의 중심부까지 이르는 총체적·직접적인 직관이다. 첫번째 방법은 목적을 성취하고 세계에 영항을 미치는 데는 유용하지만 사물의 본질적 실재에는 도달할 수 없다. 왜냐하면 이 방법으로는 직관에 의해서만 파악할 수 있는 지속과 끊임없는 흐름을 알 수 없기 때문이다. 베르그송의 저작 전체는 지속이 사물의 가장 내적인 실재를 이루고 있다는 자신의 직관의 의미와 함축을 더 풍부하게 탐구해가는 과정으로 볼 수 있다.
 
말년
 
1921년까지 베르그송은 형식상 교수직을 지켰지만 1914년에 이미 콜레주 드 프랑스의 모든 현역에서 은퇴했다. 1915년 이후 아카데미 프랑세즈의 '불멸의 40인' 회원이 됨으로써 프랑스에서 받을 수 있는 최고의 명예를 누렸고 1927년에는 노벨 문학상을 받았다.
〈창조적 진화〉 이후 25년이 지나 또 하나의 중요한 저술 〈도덕과 종교의 두 원천 Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion〉(1932)이 발간되었다. 이전의 저술과 마찬가지로 이 책도 정적인 것과 동적인 것의 양극 대립이 근본적인 통찰력을 준다고 주장했다. 따라서 그가 보기에 인간의 도덕적·사회적·종교적 삶은 한편으로는 닫힌 사회의 산물로서 성문화한 법과 관습에 복종하여 나타난 것이고, 다른 한편으로는 열린 사회의 산물로서 자신들이 살고 있는 집단의 구조를 넘어서거나 깨뜨릴 수 있는 경지에 이른 영웅과 신비로운 성인의 동적인 영감을 표현한 것이다(→ 도덕, 종교철학). 그러므로 2종류의 도덕, 아니 2종류의 원천이 있다. 하나는 지성에 뿌리를 두고 있으면서 과학과 과학의 정적·기계론적인 이상에 도달하는 것이고, 다른 하나는 직관에 근거하면서 철학과 예술의 자유로운 창조성뿐만 아니라 성인들의 신비로운 경험 속에서 나타나는 것이다. 〈창조적 진화〉에서 생명의 약동이란 개념이 갖고 있던 성격과 비교해보면, 〈도덕과 종교의 두 원천〉에서 베르그송은 정통 종교의 신(神) 개념에 더 가까이 가 있다. 1937년의 유서에서 "성찰하면 할수록 나는 가톨릭 신앙에 점점 가깝게 다가갔으며 그 속에서 유대교가 완전히 성취되었음을 깨달았다"고 쓰면서 이 점을 인정했다. 그러나 이것은 가톨릭 신앙에 대한 '도덕적 지지'를 선언한 것일 뿐, 결코 그 이상은 아니었다. 그는 다음과 같은 설명을 덧붙였다. "만일 내가 반(反)유대주의의 걷잡을 수 없는 물결이 수년 동안 세계를 뒤흔들 것임을 예견하지 못했더라면, 개종자가 되었을 것이다. 나는 미래에 박해받을 수밖에 없는 운명을 가진 사람들 틈에 남아 있고 싶었다." 이 확신을 확인하기 위해서 그는 죽기 몇 주 전에 병든 몸을 이끌고 비시 프랑스가 제정한 법에 따라 유대인으로서 등록하기 위해 줄을 섰으며, 특별히 예외로 해주겠다는 정부의 제안을 거부했다.
 
영향
 
비록 베르그송 학파가 형성되지는 않았지만 베르그송의 영향력은 상당한 것이었다. 베르그송은 프랑스 철학자들에게 가장 큰 영향을 미쳤으나 미국과 영국, 특히 윌리엄 제임스나 G. 산타야나, 20세기의 위대한 과정형이상학자인 앨프레드 노스 화이트헤드에게도 큰 영향을 미쳤다.
관련 멀티미디어 (총 1건)
 
 
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